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Taming the “Frankenstein Monster”:  Copyright Claim 
Compatibility with the Class Action Mechanism 
Renee G. Stern* 
INTRODUCTION 
In a 2013 opinion denying class certification to a putative class of copyright 
holders in Football Association Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., Judge 
Stanton of the Southern District of New York wrote: 
Generally speaking, copyright claims are poor candidates for class-action treatment.  
They have superficial similarities . . . . Thus, accumulation of all the copyright claims, 
and claimants, into one action will not simplify or unify the process of their 
resolution, but multiply its difficulties over the normal one-by-one adjudications of 
copyright cases.1 
Judge Stanton went on to characterize the case as a “Frankenstein monster posing 
as a class action”—that is, as an unnatural attempt to unify mismatched parts.2  
Given the individualized inquiries involved in resolving copyright infringement 
claims, Judge Stanton’s position against certifying such classes makes intuitive 
sense.  If class actions aim to resolve common claims, questions that address only a 
single class member would push against the efficiency of the class action 
mechanism and an attempt to unite those claims would only lead to judicial 
disaster.  However, copyright infringement can occur in a sweeping manner 
through a single act or identical course of conduct involving a broad set of works.3  
In these cases, the tension between copyright law and the class action mechanism 
can be overstated.  The danger of such overstatement is the potential for judges to 
give such wholesale treatment to all putative copyright-holder classes instead of 
assessing them on a case-by-case basis.4 
 
 * Columbia Law School, J.D., 2015; Harvard University, A.B., 2012.  Many thanks to Robert 
Clarida and Taylor Jones for their guidance and to the author’s family and friends for their support 
during the writing of this Note. 
 1. Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 64, 65–66 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
 2. See “Frankenstein,” in THE AMERICAN HERITAGE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL 
LITERACY (3d ed. 2005) (describing Dr. Frankenstein’s monster as “a manlike monster from parts of 
cadavers [brought] to life by the power of an electrical charge”). 
 3. For instance, an infringer may copy and upload hundreds of copyrighted films to an online 
streaming platform.  The action is exactly the same across the entire set of works, though each work has 
unique attributes. 
 4. See, e.g., Blagman v. Apple Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5453(ALC)(JCF), 2013 WL 2181709, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013) (agreeing with the Football Association court that “copyright claims are poor 
candidates for class-action treatment” but dismissing defendant’s motion to strike because it is 
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To put this point in context, assume the following hypothetical set of facts:  two 
members of a local photography guild, Arnold and Beth, approach a lawyer in their 
home city of New York about the possibility of bringing a copyright infringement 
claim against an online gallery, PhotogaPub, on behalf of a worldwide class of 
photographers.  PhotogaPub initially went about obtaining authorization from 
various photographers to post their work to the site—Arnold even granted the site a 
nonexclusive license to make digital copies of five of his photos and to display 
them online to users within the United States.  However, many photographers, such 
as Beth, did not grant any such permission and believe that PhotogaPub’s reposting 
of their work constitutes an infringement.  Even though Arnold granted the site a 
limited license as to some of his work, PhotogaPub went on to repost unlicensed 
copies of his work and refused to limit access to the licensed photos to users within 
the United States.  Arnold and Beth are convinced that thousands of pictures on 
PhotogaPub’s site are infringements.  Their lawyer instinctively believes their 
claims would be well-suited for class-wide adjudication, but she is wary of the 
implications of the Football Association court’s stance. 
Contrary to Judge Stanton’s assertion, this Note will argue that certifying a class 
of copyright holders—such as the one Arnold and Beth seek to represent in the 
PhotogaPub hypothetical—is not presumptively impossible, but that putative 
copyright holder classes and types of copyright claims may lie at various points 
along a spectrum of certifiability.  To guide this argument, this Note will 
periodically revisit the PhotogaPub fact pattern to work through the different ways 
that a putative class of copyright holders can tailor itself to meet the class 
certification requirements. 
Part I.A. will start the discussion with an overview of current class certification 
jurisprudence.  It will explain how the Supreme Court has heightened the 
requirements necessary to certify a class by strengthening commonality and 
expanding the more difficult Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) certification 
standard to encompass more types of classes than it previously did.  Part I.B. will 
then discuss how certain aspects of copyright law can come into direct conflict with 
the uniformity required by Rule 23 and undermine a putative class’s attempt at 
certification. 
Part II will step back from the theoretical framework set out by Part I and 
analyze actual attempts by copyright holders to certify their claims on a class-wide 
basis.  First, Part II.A. will demonstrate why Judge Stanton’s Football Association 
case was a particularly poor candidate for class certification, properly characterized 
as a Frankenstein monster posing as a class action.  However, as this Part will 
discuss further, Football Association represents the outer, non-certifiable end of the 
class certification spectrum.  By looking at other cases, Part II.B. will demonstrate 
how claimants can limit and streamline their putative classes into manageable, 
certifiable groups.  Part II.B. will then address Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. 
(Google Books), and the middle of the spectrum between Football Association and 
 
procedurally errant to strike a class allegation for failure to satisfy the class certification requirements) 
(citing Football Ass’n, 297 F.R.D. 64). 
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Napster, where the claim appears to be fit for class-wide resolution but the class 
itself has some arguably non-certifiable aspects.  Part II.C. will suggest that the 
Second Circuit’s unease with making a definitive determination on the close call of 
class certification in Google Books led the court to push the assessment of a 
discrete issue—fair use—to avoid having to decide the class certification issue.  
The Second Circuit’s quasi-issue certification move presents an alternative path for 
putative copyright holder classes that straddle the same lines as the putative Google 
Books class, rather than rolling the dice with the sometimes unpredictable class 
certification doctrine as to an entire claim.  
I.  CLASS ACTION AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT:   
AN OVERVIEW 
A.  THE GROWING BAR TO CLASS CERTIFICATION 
Before considering the fitness of the class action mechanism for copyright 
infringement claims, it is important to revisit the class certification requirements.  
Rule 23(a) lays out the prerequisites to establishing class certification—numerosity, 
commonality, typicality of the representative parties’ claims and adequacy of 
representation.5  In addition to these basic requirements, copyright holder classes 
must also satisfy one of the Rule 23(b) requirements; of these requirements, Rule 
23(b)(3) establishes the greatest roadblock to putative classes, requiring that 
common questions of law or fact predominate over questions that are 
individualized to certain class members and that class-wide adjudication is superior 
to other available methods of resolving the controversy.6 
Because 23(a)’s numerosity and typicality requirements present lesser bars to 
classes of copyright holders, which are often large and subject to the stringent 
standards of Rule 23(b)(3), I will devote less attention to these elements.  
Generally, courts have resisted defining strict numerical limits on class size and 
have instead focused on the ascertainability of the class size and prudential 
concerns such as judicial economy.7  In addition to concerns about judicial 
 
 5. FED R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 6. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  While a putative class of copyright holders may theoretically utilize 
23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) as grounds for certification, these provisions of Rule 23 will not be the focus of 
this Note.  Rule 23(b)(1) is typically used in cases where a defendant, if sued separately by each member 
of the class, might be ordered to take different types of actions to remedy the harm done.  See  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(b)(1).  Because remedies in copyright infringement cases are fairly standard and do not 
involve different shades of injunctive relief, 23(b)(1) is not of great utility here.  Similarly, copyright 
holder classes typically seek monetary damages, negating the utility of 23(b)(2) claims for injunctive 
relief for copyright holder classes.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 7. See, e.g., Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993) (Although the court noted that 
classes below a certain size would raise a presumption against numerosity and vice versa, it stressed that 
certain factors should still be considered, including “judicial economy arising from the avoidance of a 
multiplicity of actions, geographic dispersion of class members, financial resources of class members, 
the ability of claimants to institute individual suits, and requests for prospective injunctive relief which 
would involve future class members.” (internal citations omitted)); Rex v. Owens ex rel. Oklahoma, 585 
F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir. 1978) (“In class action suits there must be presented some evidence of 
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economy, Rule 23 is also concerned with providing a fair resolution for each 
member of the class.  Therefore, typicality asks whether the named plaintiff’s claim 
is so “interrelated” with the class’s claims that the named plaintiffs will fairly 
protect the absent class members.8  This concern overlaps with commonality and 
adequacy, which I will take in turn.9 
With its decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court recast 
the commonality requirement and caused disagreement in the lower courts over the 
rigor of the commonality analysis.  In Wal-Mart, a putative class of current and 
former Wal-Mart employees brought a Title VII action against Wal-Mart for 
alleged discrimination against women.10  Below, the Northern District of California 
certified the class, which included all female Wal-Mart employees nationwide, and 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.11  The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that plaintiffs 
failed to establish commonality because they could not identify a uniform practice 
of discrimination that would provide a common answer to the claims presented by 
class members, who held positions at different levels throughout myriad regions 
across the United States.12  Quoting Professor Nagareda, the Court concluded that 
commonality is not satisfied by “the raising of common ‘questions’ . . . but, rather 
the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive 
the resolution of the litigation.  Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what 
have the potential to impede the generation of common answers.”13  Therefore, 
plaintiffs’ “claims must depend upon a common contention . . . of such a nature 
that is capable of class-wide resolution—which means that determination of its 
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the 
claims in one stroke.”14 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that the majority raised the threshold of the 
Rule 23(a) commonality requirement so that it now resembles Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance requirement.15  If Justice Ginsburg’s assertion is accepted, Wal-Mart 
has clear implications for putative 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, which previously did 
not need to prove that common issues predominate over individual ones.16  This 
presumptive upsetting of the pre-Wal-Mart commonality standard has caused 
disagreement among lower courts.  Where some lower courts take Justice 
Ginsburg’s reading, others have taken narrower views of Wal-Mart’s effect on the 
commonality requirement.  Such courts have certified classes even where 
 
established ascertainable numbers constituting the class in order to satisfy even the most liberal 
interpretation of the numerosity requirement.  There is, however, no set formula to determine if the class 
is so numerous that it should be so certified.  The determination is to be made in particular 
circumstances of the case.”). 
 8. Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2544 (2011). 
 11. See id. at 2546. 
 12. See id. at 2555–56. 
 13. Id. at 2551 (internal citations omitted). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2). 
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individualized actions had more of a hand in the alleged wrongdoing than a 
common course of action did.17  Yet other courts have shifted their focus away 
from Wal-Mart’s purported transformation of commonality into predominance, 
holding that the decision heightened the commonality requirement but not to the 
level of predominance.18 
However, even in such jurisdictions that do not read the decision as 
transforming commonality into a question of predominance, Wal-Mart still raised 
the class certification bar.  The Wal-Mart Court held that claims for monetary relief 
that are not incidental to the requested injunctive relief cannot be certified under 
23(b)(2) and must instead be certified under 23(b)(3).19  This holding makes claims 
for mixed injunctive and monetary relief subject to the predominance requirement 
where they otherwise would not have been. 
Adequacy is the second major 23(a) hurdle.  To satisfy the adequacy 
requirement, “a class representative must be part of the class and possess the same 
interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.”20  The Supreme Court 
took up this requirement in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, where it affirmed 
the Third Circuit’s order vacating the certification of a settlement class.21  Though 
Amchem involves a settlement class, its analysis of the adequacy requirement is 
accepted as the standard for non-settlement classes under Rule 23 as well.22  In 
Amchem, plaintiffs sought to certify a global settlement class of current and future 
asbestos-related claims.23  The Court concluded that the representation was 
inadequate because plaintiffs sought to represent class members who suffered 
injuries due to asbestos exposure and those who were already exposed to asbestos 
but had yet to suffer any harm because of it.24  Because these class members’ 
claims were not on par with each other, the class should have been divided into 
subclasses, each with a representative that fell into the same category of past or 
future injury as his or her respective class’s members.25  Two years later, in Ortiz v. 
 
 17. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 488 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.) (reversing denial of class certification on plaintiffs’ Title VII claim where 
defendant had a policy of giving local branches broad discretion, even though local branches’ policies 
differed, and holding that Wal-Mart was decided on the fact that the class had no common issues at all); 
Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class certification to a class 
of plaintiffs targeted for stop and frisk by individual officers because stop and frisk was a department-
wide policy; noting that “even after Wal-Mart, Rule 23(b)(2) suits remain appropriate mechanisms for 
obtaining injunctive relief in cases where a centralized policy is alleged to impact a large class of 
plaintiffs, even when the magnitude (and existence) of the impact may vary by class member”). 
 18. See, e.g., In re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation, 863 F. Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 2012) 
(reconsidering a certification order because Wal-Mart created a new, stricter legal standard for 
commonality requiring rigorous analysis of the pleadings). 
 19. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011). 
 20. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997) (citing East Tex. Motor 
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977)). 
 21. See id. at 629. 
 22. See 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:58 (5th ed. 2011) (noting 
that Amchem’s adequacy holding is uniformly accepted). 
 23. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598. 
 24. See id. at 626. 
 25. See id. at 627 (“Where differences among members of a class are such that subclasses must be 
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Fiberboard Corp., the Supreme Court elaborated on Amchem, holding that an 
undivided class of individuals exposed to asbestos whose claims had drastically 
different values because of defendant’s changing insurance coverage was 
inadequately represented by the named plaintiffs.26  As demonstrated by these two 
similar cases, there are many circumstances that can differentiate class 
representatives from class members and render them inadequate advocates. 
However, just because class members are differently situated does not mean that 
a putative class necessarily cannot satisfy the adequacy requirement:  “Only 
conflicts that are fundamental to the suit and that go the heart of the litigation 
prevent a plaintiff from meeting the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy requirement.”27  As 
noted by the First Circuit, “to forestall class certification the intra-class conflict 
must be so substantial as to overbalance the common interests of the class members 
as a whole.”28  In addition to the temporal and value differences noted above, such 
fundamental conflicts that overbalance the common interests include whether some 
class members benefit from the same facts alleged to be harmful to their co-class 
members.29  This type of harm/benefit conflict may present a bar to class 
certification in copyright infringement cases, as this Note will discuss below. 
Finally, copyright infringement classes often seek monetary damages and are 
thus subject to Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements, as 
noted above.30  Per the Wal-Mart discussion, predominance presents a high bar to 
class certification where the defendant must approach certain aspects of class 
members’ claims on individualized bases.31  Predominance asks whether putative 
classes are “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”32  One 
type of question that might undermine a predominance finding is an individualized 
question of injury-in-fact.  But an inquiry into injury-in-fact or a similarly 
individualized question will not defeat a motion to certify a class unless it is more 
substantial than the issues that are subject to common, generalized proof.33  That 
said, plaintiffs cannot prevail by merely asserting that general issues may exist.  As 
the Supreme Court recently decided in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, courts may look 
into the merits of plaintiffs’ claims to determine whether the generalized proof has 
bearing on the theory of the claims.34  What it ultimately comes down to, as driven 
 
established . . . the members of each subgroup cannot be bound to a settlement except by consents given 
by those who understand that their role is to represent solely the members of their respective 
subgroups.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 26. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856–57 (1999). 
 27. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 22, § 3:58 (emphasis added). 
 28. Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 138 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 29. See, e.g., Grimes v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 331 Fed. Appx. 630, 626–33 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming the district court’s denial of class certification); Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco 
Healthcare Grp. L.P., 247 F.R.D. 156, 177 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 31. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2265 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 32. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). 
 33. See Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91, 108–09 (2d 
Cir. 2007); Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247, 1252 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 34. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1429 (2013) (decertifying a 23(b)(3) class 
because plaintiffs did not present a damages calculation that correlated to a generalized theory of 
STERN, TAMING THE “FRANKENSTEIN MONSTER,” 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 549 (2015) 
2015] TAMING THE “FRANKENSTEIN MONSTER” 555 
home by the superiority requirement, is that adjudicating the claim as a class action 
must be more fair to the litigants, more manageable for the courts and more 
efficient all around to justify a grant of class certification.35 
Given the high standards set by Rule 23 and the Supreme Court’s narrow 
interpretation of them in its recent jurisprudence, class certification has become 
more difficult for putative classes bringing virtually any type of claim.36  The 
newly rigorous inquiry into commonality and the changing attitude about assessing 
the merits of plaintiffs’ claims at the class certification stage, without a jury, 
implies that there is a strong presumption against the class-wide adjudicability of 
claims.37  While some claims lend themselves more easily to the production of a 
uniform class, the area of law under which a claim is brought has less of a 
connection to its certifiability than do the sheer breadth of the class and the 
complexity of the issues the class presents.38  The following section will discuss 
some of the aspects of copyright claims that might make a court skeptical of 
certifying a class of copyright holders and lay the foundation for understanding 
why Football Association was an extreme case. 
B.  WHERE CLASS CERTIFICATION AND COPYRIGHT CLAIMS COLLIDE 
While Rule 23’s requirements ensure that there is enough cohesion between a 
class’s various claims such that it would be more efficient to hear them collectively 
rather than separately, many of the inquiries that arise during a copyright 
infringement case are individualized and sound in the incentive-based nature of 
copyright.  These issues include determination of ownership and damages, analysis 
of individual cases of alleged infringement and evaluation of defenses.  As with 
any other class-wide claims, just because there are individualized questions for the 
court to address does not mean that a well-crafted class cannot overcome these 
barriers.  This Note will later discuss in Part II.B how various plaintiffs have 
crafted successful copyright holder classes in the past and demonstrate through the 
PhotogaPub hypothetical how such plaintiffs can best tailor their putative classes 
going forward. 
Copyright classes are especially susceptible to failing for a lack of 
 
liability).  This represents a change in the Court’s attitude from the proposition that the Court “find[s] 
nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a 
class action.”  Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). 
 35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 36. See Jenna C. Smith, “Carving at the Joints”:  Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consumer 
Class Actions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (2013). 
 37. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to 
Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 476 (2013). 
 38. Take, for example, the claim at issue in Wal-Mart.  It seems that, to the Court, a class 
consisting of all of the female employees in a single district where there was a district-wide policy that 
discriminated against women would be easily conceivable and fit for certification.  It was because the 
class was so large as to encompass all of Wal-Mart’s female employees nationwide that the Court 
became suspicious of how disparate the claim’s actual breadth would prove to be on the merits from the 
size of the purported class. 
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predominance and commonality in cases where an affirmative defense such as fair 
use is at issue.  Congress has codified four statutory fair use factors,39 but has done 
little to define the contours of the factors, leaving that task for each court to 
determine on a case-by-case basis.40  Consequently, a fair use analysis involves a 
subjective evaluation of proof that has the ability to spiral out into deeper and 
deeper factual inquiries regarding the status of the copyrighted work and the 
particulars of each asserted use.41 
Variations in the applicability of the fair use defense could cut to the core of a 
putative class’s purported commonality.  The fair use factors not only require 
individualized inquiries, but they also yield unpredictable results.  That is to say, 
the same type of use could be fair in some works but unfair in the case of others.  A 
finding of commonality is jeopardized whenever some aspect of two seemingly 
identical infringing uses is distinguishable.  For example, in our hypothetical case, 
Arnold and Beth’s lawyer can convincingly argue that all of her clients are 
similarly situated with regard to the third fair use factor, “the amount and 
substantially of the portion used,” because each work has been copied in its 
entirety.  However, a slam-dunk on this factor may not alone be sufficient to show 
commonality.  For instance, the second fair use factor requires courts to evaluate 
the nature of the work, which involves an assessment of the strength of each work’s 
copyright and the effect an alleged infringement has on the copyright’s world 
market.42  The more varied the original works are, the more likely it is that the 
applicability of the fair use defense will vary as to individual members of the 
putative class.  This second fair use factor presents a bigger problem in Arnold and 
Beth’s case—PhotogaPub’s lawyer might be able to convince a court that each 
photo presents a different analysis as to originality of composition and the extent of 
the artist’s creative efforts displaying in each photograph. 
In addition, fair use’s fourth factor—the effect on the market for the copyrighted 
work—may cause the court to doubt the adequacy of a class’s representation.  
While a fair use defense does not hinge on whether a copyright holder benefits 
from a defendant’s unauthorized use of his work,43 it is true in some cases that the 
unauthorized use of copyrighted material incidentally confers such benefit on the 
 
 39. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  These factors are:  (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used; and (4) the 
effect of the use upon the copyrighted work’s potential market. 
 40. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (“[Section 107] endorses the purpose and general 
scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute . . 
. .  Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, 
the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 41. See David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 281 (2003). 
 42. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012).  With regard to the fourth fair use factor, effect on the market 
for the original work, the court must analyze whether defendant’s use usurps the market for the 
copyrighted work.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).  This involves 
an evaluation of whether the markets, or potential markets, for the two works intersect rather than a 
mere analysis of whether demand for the copyrighted work has been reduced. 
 43. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 485 (1984). 
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copyright holder and that some copyright holders may even encourage the 
unauthorized use of their work.44  In our hypothetical, for example, it would not be 
surprising if some photographers were okay with PhotogaPub’s use because it 
brought more widespread attention to their works.  Incentives are bound to vary 
from creator to creator, and such variance could be fatal to class certification 
because courts view copyright as an individualized right which speaks to a 
particular maker’s incentives to create and disseminate his work.45 
Like a fair use determination, determining copyright ownership can cause 
tension between individual concerns and class-wide resolution.  Section 501(b) of 
the Copyright Act requires that plaintiffs prove legal or beneficial copyright 
ownership to establish standing to sue.46  Because “ownership” is a broad concept, 
it can be difficult to pin down.47  Establishing ownership in the first instance 
includes questions of authorship.  Furthermore, because copyright is divisible, there 
might be confusion as to who can claim ownership to the particular right at issue.  
Determining whether an author can claim copyright ownership in his work or 
whether a contributor can claim copyright ownership in the whole work—and 
untangling the issue of beneficial ownership on top of all that—is often subject to 
the types of factual determinations that could undermine predominance. 
For example, when someone creates a work on behalf of another it is sometimes 
unclear who has a claim to the copyright.  Under the Copyright Act, a work made 
for hire is a work that is:  (1) “prepared by an employee within the scope of his or 
her employment” or (2) “specially ordered or commissioned for use” in one of the 
types of works enumerated in the definition if the parties agreed in writing that the 
work would be for hire.48 
The Supreme Court took up the first definition of work made for hire in 
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, which involved a dispute over the 
ownership in the copyright of a sculpture that James Earl Reid produced for 
Community for Creative Non-Violence’s (CCNV’s) use.49  Looking to agency law, 
the Court invoked a “non-exhaustive” list of factors to be considered in 
determining whether an author acted in the capacity of an employee, including: 
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
 
 44. See, e.g., Defendant Google Inc.’s Opposition to Motion for Class Certification at 3–4, 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 05 Civ. 08136 (DC)), 
2012 WL 1615910 [hereinafter Google’s Opposition to Class Certification] (discussing the results of 
Google’s survey of authors regarding Google’s digitization project, which showed that while a 
percentage of authors opposed Google’s project, others supported it). 
 45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Sony, 464 U.S. at 450 (“The purpose of copyright is to create 
incentives for creative effort.”). 
 46. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012); see also Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 
(9th Cir. 2005) (noting that even though the Copyright Act does not expressly limit standing to sue for 
copyright infringement to the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right, Congress’s explicit 
enumeration of who may sue for copyright infringement should be read to exclude all others). 
 47. See Christopher M. Newman, An Exclusive License Is Not an Assignment:  Disentangling 
Divisibility and Transferability of Ownership in Copyright, 74 LA. L. REV. 59, 67–68 (2013). 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 49. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 733 (1989). 
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work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has 
the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s 
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s 
role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of 
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee 
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.50 
Critics of the Court’s analysis have noted that consideration of these factors opens 
the door to exhausting factual disputes over copyright ownership that involve 
overly-complex and detailed analyses of foregone work relationships.51 
To counteract the Supreme Court’s decision in CCNV, the Senate considered an 
amendment to the definition of “work made for hire.”52  By specifying that an 
“employee” for the purposes of this section would only encompass “formal salaried 
employee[s],” this amendment would have negated the need to turn to agency law 
or to engage in a long list of indeterminate factors.53  Though the amendment never 
passed, its proposal demonstrates how convoluted and complex the determination 
of original ownership is under the Court’s doctrine. 
But even if the fact-intensive nature of determining whether an author was 
acting as an employee during his work were eased, in many situations there would 
still be a set of individualized questions left over for a court.  After determining that 
Reid was an independent contractor because he used his own tools, worked in his 
own studio and was retained for a short duration to create only the specific project 
at issue, the Supreme Court still could not make a final determination on who 
owned copyright in the work.54  Though CCNV conceded that § 101(2)’s writing 
requirement under the work for hire definition was not satisfied,55 there remained 
questions as to whether CCNV or the “dozen different people” Reid hired to help 
complete the work were joint authors of the work and thus had a claim to copyright 
ownership as well.56 
Under § 201(a) of the Copyright Act, copyright vests in the author or authors of 
 
 50. See id. at 751–52 (internal citations omitted). 
 51. See, e.g., 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
5.03[B][1][a][iii] (rev. ed. 1978–date); Alexandra Duran, Community for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid:  The Supreme Court Reduces Predictability by Attributing an Agency Standard to the Work for 
Hire Doctrine of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1103 (1990) (noting that the Court’s 
failure to provide a bright line rule to determine employment status “portend[s] litigation” by requiring 
fact finding in the first instance); Carolyn M. Salzmann, You Commissioned It, You Bought It, but Do 
You Own It?  The Work for Hire:  Why Is Something so Simple, so Complicated?, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 
497, 498 (2000). 
 52. See S. 1253, 101st Cong. § 101 (1989). 
 53. Id.; see also Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws:  Hearings on S. 1198 and S. 1253 Before 
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, 101st Cong. 204 (1989) (statement of Ralph 
Oman, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) (stating that the S. 1253 amendment was 
necessary after the Court’s decision in CCNV because the decision “introduces uncertainty into the 
business relationship by setting out 11 different interrelated criteria that should be examined [and] 
makes many ownership determinations ad hoc and post hoc because we cannot evaluate many of the 
criteria until after the work is completed”). 
 54. See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 752–53. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. at 734; see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 51, § 5.03[B][1][a][iii]. 
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a work.57  But determining whether someone claiming authorship is actually an 
author is not always as simple as it sounds.  Disputes often arise as to whether 
multiple authors have joint ownership in the copyright of a work or whether one 
author can lay claim to the entire copyright despite additions by other parties.  
Congress defines a “joint work” as one “prepared by two or more authors with the 
intent that the contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a 
unitary whole.”58  Individualized questions of fact and law enter in determining 
intent to create a joint work and whether the contribution of an alleged joint author 
can support a claim of authorship.  As with the work for hire doctrine, joint work 
determinations may present a bar to class certification where the putative class is so 
widely defined that class members’ copyright ownership is not a given. 
Where the parties do not agree to joint ownership in writing, establishing intent, 
like establishing employment under the work for hire doctrine, involves an in depth 
evaluation of the parties’ circumstances at the time the work was created.59  To 
determine whether intent to be joint authors was present, courts will look to 
whether a party had decisionmaking authority over the work, whether a party was 
credited as a co-author of the work, whether a party was considered a co-author in 
agreements with third parties and whether the parties regarded themselves as co-
authors or one of the parties took a firm stance of sole authorship.60  Intent to 
merge multiple parties’ contributions in this way is so fact intensive because the 
court is effectively asking whether there was a meeting of the minds, whether a 
reasonable person would have understood that he was entering into a joint venture 
for joint credit and, more importantly for the sake of this discussion, for joint 
ownership of copyright.61  Furthermore, because these determinations are often 
made well after the work was created and when arguments between parties as to 
whether they were co-authors have worn at their relationships, proof of intent is not 
necessarily easy to come by and can make the inquiries even more demanding.62 
A court’s inquiry into whether the contribution was substantial enough to satisfy 
§ 101’s requirements is similarly individualized.  For a contribution to warrant co-
authorship in a work for its creator, all circuits agree that it must be more than a de 
minimis contribution and that the contribution must be one of authorship, not one 
of financing or inexpressive labor.63  This inquiry is individualized enough; 
 
 57. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012). 
 58. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 59. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 60. See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 204–05 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 61. See Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
123, 150–51 (2002). 
 62. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 51, § 6.07[C]. 
 63. See id. § 6.07[A].  To this end, guidelines for writers of scientific research articles stress that 
writers should not name as authors individuals who have administrative authority over the researchers or 
who procure funding for the research because these contributions, though worthy of non-authorial credit, 
do not constitute authorship and misnaming such individuals as authors can be misleading.  See Jason 
W. Osborne & Abigail Holland, What Is Authorship, and What Should It Be? A Survey of Prominent 
Guidelines for Determining Authorship in Scientific Publications, 14 PRAC. ASSESSMENT RES. & 
EVALUATION 1, 2–4 (July 2009). 
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however, virtually all of the circuit courts have an additional requirement that the 
contribution be independently copyrightable, creating an even more invasive 
inquiry into questions of law.64  For example, in Childress v. Taylor the Second 
Circuit adopted the independent copyrightability requirement to prevent frivolous 
claims by contributors of material whose contributions do not constitute 
authorship.65  Though the Second Circuit determined that the parties lacked the 
requisite intent to establish co-authorship and thus did not go into a deep analysis 
of the copyrightability of Taylor’s contribution, the court’s later decisions have 
confirmed that a party’s independent contributions would be subject to the same 
copyrightability inquiries as would a whole work.66  This includes a determination 
that the work is original, fixed in a tangible medium of expression and possesses 
“at least some minimal degree of creativity.”67  Once again, the absence of a formal 
written agreement as to each party’s relationship to the work can make the 
ownership inquiry a trial in itself. 
In some cases it may be easy to establish whether a party is an initial owner of 
the copyright in a given work, but copyright’s divisibility may require further 
inquiry into whether a party owns the particular right at issue.  Section 106 of the 
Copyright Act lists the discrete rights that come along with copyright ownership.68  
Under the 1976 Act, copyright is thus a bundle of rights that can be divided among 
non-authors through licenses and assignments of ownership.69  Because copyright 
ownership can be transferred in whole or in part,70 conflicts arise over ownership of 
particular rights when the extent of the transfer is not made clear at the outset.71 
The difficulty in determining the extent of ambiguous grants is illustrated by the 
disagreement before the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Tasini.72  There, 
freelance writers and publishers disagreed as to whether an agreement to include an 
article in a newspaper or magazine—i.e., a collective work—gave the periodical 
 
 64. Compare 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.2.1.2 (1989), 
with 1 NIMMER, supra note 51, § 6.07[A][3] (rejecting the holdings of several circuit courts that the 
contribution must be independently copyrightable).  The Seventh Circuit is the remaining holdout that 
does not require that each author’s contribution be independently copyrightable in order to sustain a 
claim of joint copyright ownership.  See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(“Gaiman’s contribution may not have been copyrightable by itself, but his contribution had expressive 
content without which [the character] Cogliostro wouldn’t have been a character at all, but merely a 
drawing.  The expressive work that is the comic-book character Count Nicholas Cogliostro was the joint 
work of Gaiman and McFarlane—their contributions strike us as quite equal—and both are entitled to 
ownership of the copyright.”). 
 65. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 66. See Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 67. Id. (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)). 
 68. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 69. See Newman, supra note 47, at 61. 
 70. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2012). 
 71. See, e.g., Leisure Time Entm’t v. Cal. Vista, No. 94-56407, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 5751, at 
*4 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 1996) (holding that the term “exploit” in an agreement giving defendant “the 
exclusive right, under copyright, to exhibit, to distribute, sell and otherwise deal in and exploit” 
plaintiff’s works could be understood broadly to allow defendant the right to create derivative works or 
narrowly to limit defendant’s rights to distribution and sale). 
 72. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
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publisher the right to license the article for use in searchable electronic databases.73  
At the core of this case was a disagreement over the extent of the “privilege” that § 
201(c) of the Copyright Act grants to owners of a collective work.  Section 201(c) 
provides that the owner of a collective work has acquired “the privilege of 
reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective 
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the 
same series.”74 
While the district court interpreted the § 201(c) privilege as constituting a non-
exclusive license to reproduce and distribute the articles themselves within certain 
limits,75 both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court held that the privilege 
under § 201(c) does not implicate the rights of the initial copyright owner.76  Under 
this view, the right to reproduce revisions of the collective work did not allow the 
publishers to transfer to the electronic databases the § 201(c) privilege to 
reassemble the articles at will. 
Tasini demonstrates how the extent of the transfer of rights is not always clear.  
Even though the freelance writers were the initial owners of the copyright in the 
individual articles because they authored the pieces, once they signed freelance 
agreements with other parties the ownership of particular rights became uncertain.  
This is not only true of § 201(c) grants of privilege, but of direct licenses and 
assignments of the divisible rights under § 106 as well.  While a contract that 
expressly denoted the boundaries of the publishers’ rights would have precluded 
the need for the courts’ intervention on this issue in the first place, parties to an 
arrangement do not necessarily have the foresight or ability to make their 
agreements so clear, necessitating individualized, ex post inquiries into ownership 
at the onset of the litigation. 
Because unclear or implied agreements with regard to initial ownership and 
transfer of rights are not unusual, it is easy to understand why in Football 
Association Judge Stanton took such a strong position against the certifiability of 
copyright holder classes.  As Judge Stanton noted, copyright claims often have only 
the appearance of similarity: 
The nature of their legal requirements and analyses are similar:  plaintiff must prove 
ownership of a copyright and the copyright work was infringed by [an unauthorized 
use of it] . . . . But that merely identifies some of the issues, each of which must be 
resolved upon facts which are particular to that single claim of infringement, and 
separate from all other claims.77 
If, before reaching the merits of a claim, a court would have to sort through 
 
 73. See id. 
 74. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2012). 
 75. See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that tagging 
each independently retrievable article with the publication title, issue and page number where it 
appeared constitutes a sufficient step to identify it as part of a particular collective work). 
 76. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 493–94. 
 77. Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 64, 65–66 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
STERN, TAMING THE “FRANKENSTEIN MONSTER,” 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 549 (2015) 
562 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [38:4 
individual determinations regarding initial ownership and the extent of transferred 
ownership, it would take equal resources to have every class member bring an 
individual claim and prove that he actually owns the right at issue.  However, as 
discussed in further detail below, not every copyright holder class will present these 
issues, and, even if a class does present these issues, it is possible that the class’s 
claim is so sweeping that it easily predominates over these individual concerns and 
thus should be heard on a class-wide basis for the sake of judicial economy and 
uniformity of outcome. 
II.  WHAT IT TAKES TO BRING A CLASS COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT CLAIM 
Thus far, this Note has focused on the obstacles that a putative class of copyright 
holders may encounter at the class certification stage.  As noted, this focus on 
where these classes may fail is not included to suggest that the Football Association 
court’s ardent position against certifying copyright holder classes is unqualifiedly 
correct.  Instead, it shows that Judge Stanton correctly identified the Football 
Association putative class as a Frankenstein’s monster, doomed to fail under 
current class action jurisprudence.  This section explores the factors that made the 
Football Association putative class a particularly poor candidate for certification.  
However, continuing with the PhotogaPub hypothetical, this section will also show 
how copyright holder plaintiffs can escape the apparent obstacles of class 
certification by carefully crafting their classes and by bringing undeniably uniform 
claims. 
A.  FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION:  A MONSTER OF TOO MANY PARTS 
In the opening of his decision to deny class certification in Football Association, 
Judge Stanton described the case as a “Frankenstein monster posing as a class 
action.”78  This description was surely apt.  Plaintiffs brought a secondary 
copyright infringement claim against YouTube for hosting allegedly infringing 
copies of plaintiffs’ work on its website.79  They brought their claim on behalf of 
two worldwide classes:  (1) the “repeat infringement class,” a class of copyright 
owners who had sent YouTube notices of infringement in the past and had 
succeeded in removing unauthorized copies of their work from the site, but who 
suffered additional infringement through subsequent uploads and (2) the “music 
publisher class,” whose musical compositions defendants allegedly “tracked, 
monetized, or identified and allowed to be used without proper authorization.”80  
Because these classes are so broadly defined, plaintiffs’ attempt at class 
certification immediately raises flags with regards to commonality, adequacy, 
predominance and superiority.  Furthermore, because plaintiffs’ claim is for 
 
 78. Id. at 65 (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, 
J., dissenting)). 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. 
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secondary liability against an online storage provider, defendant can invoke the safe 
harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).81  These 
provisions add additional individualized inquiries to the assessment of each 
putative class member’s claim, pushing the limits of the predominance requirement 
even further. 
As discussed above, the more expansive a putative class is, the more likely it is 
that plaintiffs will run into problems when trying to certify it.  That was the case 
with Football Association, where plaintiffs did not carefully limit the contours of 
the two proposed classes.  For example, instead of limiting their claims to a class of 
plaintiffs who held copyright under a uniform set of laws, plaintiffs purported to 
represent all similarly situated copyright holders worldwide.82  This would not have 
been a problem if there were uniform international copyright law, but copyright law 
differs from country to country such that a court would not be able to apply a single 
set of laws to prove each purported class member’s copyright ownership.83 
Proving ownership in such a large class presents obstacles to class certification 
even if a uniform set of laws is applied.  Plaintiffs did not limit the class by an 
easily identifiable mark of copyright ownership—such as copyright registration or 
written proof of assignment—so ascertaining each purported class member’s actual 
membership in one of the two classes would require the highly individualized 
analysis of facts described above, which could hinder a finding of predominance.  
Issues of ascertainability are exacerbated in the case of a secondary liability claim 
because each class member would also have to show that the third party uploader 
infringed on the work’s copyright before the court could come to the merits of the 
instant claim.84  Furthermore, because the purported class is not limited to 
individuals whose work was uploaded in full and includes those whose copyrighted 
works were only used in part—for example, ten seconds of a song interpolated over 
a home video—the infringement and fair use inquiries regarding the third parties’ 
actions would necessarily vary from class member to class member.85 
Football Association is also a unique case because it implicates the safe harbor 
provisions of the DMCA, which involve individualized questions of fact.  The 
difficulty of certifying a class that involves the safe harbor provisions of the 
DMCA can be better understood by looking to the Second Circuit’s reversal of the 
dual-captioned summary judgment for Viacom and the Football Association 
Premier League against YouTube.86  There, the Second Circuit demonstrated that 
the DMCA requires proof of every instance of alleged secondary liability.  Because 
there is no joint proof of YouTube’s knowledge, the DMCA safe harbor analysis 
would necessarily undermine an attempt at class certification in this case. 
 
 81. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 82. See Football Ass’n, 297 F.R.D. at 65. 
 83. See id. at 67.  With foreign works, the courts must look to the law of the source country to 
determine issues of ownership rights.  See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, 153 
F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 84. See Football Ass’n, 297 F.R.D. at 65. 
 85. See id. at 65–66. 
 86. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 42 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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Under § 512 of the DMCA, a safe harbor is available to a defendant on a 
plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims where those claims involve “information 
residing on systems or networks at the direction of users” (hereinafter referred to as 
“user upload claims”).87  The safe harbor provisions kick in after a defendant 
establishes that it is a “service provider” under the DMCA and has implemented 
mechanisms to punish infringers and to work with copyright owners to protect their 
works.88  Section 512(c)(1)(A) only provides a safe harbor for user upload claims if 
the service provider: 
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material 
on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material.89 
Because § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) requires that the service provider block the infringing 
material in order to gain the safe harbor, the Second Circuit determined that § 
512(c) requires the defendant have “knowledge or awareness of specific infringing 
activity” to be liable.90  The court made the same deduction from the text of § 
512(c)(1)(A)(ii), explaining that so-called “red flag” awareness requires that the 
provider have subjective awareness that made specific infringement “objectively 
obvious.”91 
To determine whether there was enough factual evidence to bring the claims to 
trial in light of the DMCA’s specificity requirements, the court looked to 
correspondence between YouTube’s co-founders evincing their belief that 
specifically identified clips were infringing and their intent to keep those clips on 
the website.92  On the basis of the evidence at hand, the court remanded to the 
lower court for a determination of “whether YouTube had knowledge or awareness 
of any specific instances of infringement” of the clips expressly identified in the 
suit.93 
Through its elucidation of the DMCA’s safe harbor provision for user upload 
 
 87. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).  Note that § 512 technically falls under the Online Copyright 
Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA) subdivision of the DMCA, but this Note will refer to it 
by the more commonly used parent title of DMCA. 
 88. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)–(k) (2012).  The term “service provider” as used in § 512(c) 
is “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor . . . .”  Id. § 
512(k)(1)(B). 
 89. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (emphasis added). 
 90. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 30–31.  For example, the Southern District of New York recently 
concluded that proof of Internet service provider (ISP) interaction with a user profile cannot satisfy the 
specific knowledge requirement.  Plaintiffs must show that an employee of the ISP viewed or otherwise 
interacted with the allegedly infringing material itself.  See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 
F. Supp. 2d 537, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 91. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31–32. 
 92. Id. at 34. 
 93. Id. at 41. 
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claims, the Second Circuit made clear that the Football Association plaintiffs must 
provide proof that is specifically tailored to each individual claim of secondary 
liability.  Given the court’s reasoning, even though each class member would 
present the court with the same question—did YouTube have actual knowledge of 
infringing activity and allow it to continue?—there is no readily available 
generalized proof that could address all of their claims in a single sweep.94  In sum, 
plaintiffs must:  (1) prove every class member’s claim to copyright ownership; (2) 
identify allegedly infringing clips; (3) prove that those allegedly infringing clips 
actually infringe despite defendant’s potential claims of authorization and fair use, 
and (4) provide evidence that YouTube had objective knowledge that each 
identified clip was infringing and subsequently failed to block access to it.  There is 
nothing simple about this task.  Addressing it on a class-wide basis would only give 
the illusion of expediency and tax the court with the burden of hearing thousands of 
individual claims under the guise of a cohesive set of circumstances. 
As far as claims go, Football Association was a particularly poor candidate for 
class-wide resolution because YouTube did not commit a single, identifiable act.  
YouTube did not have a policy of supporting infringing activity by its users and 
was responsive to notices from copyright holders.95  Therefore, there was no 
getting around the need to analyze each class member’s claim on an individual 
basis under the DMCA.  The only way for plaintiffs to minimize the issues 
presented by the DMCA analysis—not to mention the threshold ownership and 
direct infringement analyses—would be, to borrow Judge Stanton’s Frankenstein 
monster analogy, to lob off the class’s mismatched limbs.  As a start, this would 
mean limiting the class to U.S. copyright holders whose copyrights were registered 
by a specific date, streamlining questions of initial ownership.  It would also mean 
limiting the classes to those who had similar proof that the clip at issue was 
infringing, such as a formal acknowledgment from YouTube.96 
To strike at the issues presented by the DMCA, plaintiffs would have to pare the 
classes down even further to individuals whose works were infringed by clips that 
plaintiffs brought to YouTube’s attention in a single set of notices or that YouTube 
expressly acknowledged as likely infringements in a single form of proof.  Though 
the remaining classes would be a miniscule part of the original whole that the 
plaintiffs originally attempted to certify, if plaintiffs’ goal is to seek resolution for 
as many of these claims as it can at once, then plaintiffs need to present the court 
with a single, unitary limb of the original class instead of a poorly-sewn-together 
 
 94. For the sake of argument, one could imagine a memo or database that identifies every 
infringing clip on YouTube.  However, absent proof that such a listing exists, it is safe to assume that 
there is not one set of proof that could address every class member’s claim given the scope of the 
proposed classes. 
 95. This is apparent in the case itself.  Plaintiffs sought to certify a “repeat infringement class” 
that had succeeded in working with YouTube to remove infringing materials from the website in the 
past.  See Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 64, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 96. If a large number of class members obtained formal acknowledgments from YouTube that 
specific clips infringed on class members’ copyrights, there would be common proof to create a 
presumption that those clips indeed infringed.  This common proof would arguably lessen the burdens 
on the court and weigh in favor of granting classification. 
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monstrosity of claims.  At the same time, it is important to remember the incentives 
for maintaining a sizeable class.  First, plaintiffs want to amass a large class to 
create pressure on defendants to settle the claim and, if the alleged infringement is 
continuing, stop their allegedly infringing behavior.  Second, class counsel is only 
compensated for its work if fees are court-ordered or agreed to in a settlement.97  
Therefore, putative class counsel will necessarily balance narrowing the class to a 
manageable whole against the possibility that a class may become so limited that 
the value of its collective claims would not match the value of the lawyer’s time. 
B.  CRAFTING A NARROW CLASS OF COPYRIGHT HOLDERS 
Unlike Football Association, some copyright holder claims lend themselves 
naturally to class-wide adjudication.  The remaining sections in Part II will 
demonstrate how the very claim at issue can help to contour a manageable plaintiff 
class.  Such a manageable class can come about where plaintiffs’ claims arise under 
a form contract, where all class members are represented by the same agency or 
where defendant’s conduct is so uniform across the class that generalized proof is 
easily obtained.  These remaining sections will also engage more directly with the 
PhotogaPub hypothetical to show how a putative class can work within the case 
law’s framework moving forward. 
Disputes over widely-used form contracts are healthy breeding grounds for class 
certification.98  Even though each contract at issue is discrete, since most of their 
terms are identical they can be easily dealt with in the aggregate and do not present 
the court with unmanageable issues of proof.99  But, where the contract terms are 
ambiguous or are not expressly written, individual variations on those contracts 
have bearing on the underlying copyright claim.  In those cases, predominance re-
emerges as a barrier to certification because generalized proof is no longer 
accessible and state law differences in contract interpretation may fracture an 
otherwise cohesive class.100  This split between a cohesive copyright contract claim 
and a non-cohesive one is illustrated in Wu v. Pearson Education, Inc.101 
Photographer Norbert Wu attempted to certify two classes based on two distinct 
claims:  the first claim (Wu I) alleged that the publisher Pearson specified particular 
print-runs for its books in licensing agreements and then exceeded the agreed-upon 
print-runs; the second claim (Wu II) alleged that Pearson printed copyrighted 
photographs in their books and only obtained licensing agreements after the fact.102  
The differences between the certifiability of these two claims came out during the 
 
 97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
 98. See David Horton, Flipping the Script:  Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 
80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 433 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 99. See generally id. 
 100. See id. at 433–34. 
 101. See Wu v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 102. See id. at 260–61; see also Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Wu v. Pearson Educ. Inc. 
(Wu I), No. 09 Civ. 6557 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009), 2009 WL 2402328; Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial, Wu v. Pearson Educ. Inc. (Wu II), No. 10 Civ. 6537 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010), 2010 WL 
3533624. 
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predominance inquiry into each one.  Based on the limited evidence before the 
court at the time, the Wu I class was fit for certification because the claim was 
based on the single contract provision that only varied slightly from contract to 
contract as to the exact size of each print-run.103  Furthermore, unlike some of the 
cases discussed above, Wu I was not susceptible to intense analyses of copyright 
ownership because the existence of a contract between defendant and each class 
member presupposes ownership.  While Wu II shared in this avoidance of common 
copyright holder class barriers, it failed on predominance because there was no 
form contract common to all of the agreements that Pearson made with each 
copyright owner.  Though each written licensing agreement was dated, Pearson 
alleged that it was industry practice to make informal arrangements to publish 
photographs before formalizing an agreement and that a number of the agreements 
contained integration clauses to merge these otherwise informal arrangements into 
the written agreements.104  Because oral evidence regarding every single 
arrangement would be necessary in order to assess the Wu II claims, it was not fit 
for adjudication on a class-wide basis.105 
This same pervasive individuality of each contract ultimately became a problem 
for Wu I after the initial discovery stage, when defendants moved to decertify the 
class.  On defendant’s motion to decertify the Wu I class, the court noted that the 
contractual relationships were not as simple as they were presented to the court at 
the certification stage.106  A more developed record showed that the form contracts 
were, in many cases, accompanied by additional written contracts and oral 
agreements and that the relationships between the copyright holders and Pearson 
were not always direct, but mediated by a photo agency.107  Therefore, the contracts 
themselves could no longer support a finding of predominance and the basic 
legitimacy of each contract was questioned because, unlike where the copyright 
owner makes the agreement himself, photo agencies without complete rights to 
each photo could have granted licenses they were unauthorized to allow.108 
Though it may not have gone well for the putative Wu classes, the Wu litigation 
provides a few helpful takeaways for classes of copyright holders.  First, just 
because a claim is based in copyright does not mean that a class cannot be certified.  
Like any putative class, the more cohesive and unified a class’s set of claims is, the 
more likely that class of copyright holders is to meet the certification requirements.  
One way to do this, as Wu I seemed to do before discovery proved otherwise, is to 
abstract out individual issues by bringing all class members under a unified 
umbrella, such as a common form contract.  Another helpful tactic is subdividing 
classes into distinct groups.  In Wu, this meant dividing the Wu I claims from the 
Wu II claims instead of attempting to certify an entire class under a jumbled group 
 
 103. See id. at 265, 273. 
 104. See id. at 274–75. 
 105. See id. at 275. 
 106. See Wu v. Pearson Educ. Inc., No. 09 Civ. 6557 (KBF), 2012 WL 6681701, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 12, 2012). 
 107. See id. at *7–8. 
 108. See id. at *7. 
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of claims.109  This helps to highlight the commonalities between class members and 
to build a stronger case for predominance than would proposing an obviously non-
homogenous class. 
Wu v. Pearson has specific applicability for the PhotogaPub putative class.  
First, the PhotogaPub class can be split into two distinct subclasses:  (1) a subclass 
of photographers like Arnold who directly contracted with PhotogaPub to allow 
limited copying of their work (Subclass A), and (2) a subclass of photographers 
like Beth who have no contractual relationship with PhotogaPub (Subclass B).  
Dividing the class in this way distinguishes class members by the types of claims 
they can bring—Subclass A having the additional breach of contract claim—and by 
the type of proof that is likely available to them.  For example, while Subclass B 
will have a more difficult time bringing common proof of copyright ownership, 
Subclass A’s contracts can at least raise a uniform presumption of each subclass 
member’s copyright ownership by virtue of the fact that these similar contracts 
with PhotogaPub exist.  If the contracts are in fact similar, Subclass A can also 
make a strong case that they, combined with PhotogaPub’s uniform course of 
conduct, provide common proof of liability that would not be better addressed on a 
case-by-case basis.  Subclass B will have a more difficult time demonstrating the 
existence of common proof, but just because Subclass B does not have a breach of 
contract claim does not mean its bid for class certification is doomed. 
One example of a class that managed to fit all the pieces together without a 
contract-based claim, and to narrow the definition of the class down enough that 
the cohesiveness of the claim warranted class certification despite the possibility 
that individualized questions may arise, was the plaintiff class involved in the 
Napster litigation.110  Like the cases against YouTube, Napster involved claims of 
secondary liability against Napster for allegedly facilitating users’ unauthorized 
reproduction and distribution of copyrighted sound recordings.111 
Plaintiffs sought to certify a 23(b)(3) class of “music publisher-principals of the 
Fox Agency that own or control at least one copyrighted musical work that has 
without their permission been made available through the Napster service on or 
after October 30, 2000.”112  Though the Napster class rooted its claims in hyper-
 
 109. Note that Wu proposed even further subdivided classes that would include only individuals on 
the same invoice or in the same publications as Wu himself to insulate his class certification claims.  See 
Wu, 277 F.R.D. at 262. 
 110. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., No. C MDL-00-1369 MHP, 2005 WL 1287611 (N.D. 
Cal. June 1, 2005).  Even though this case was decided prior to the Wal-Mart ruling, the Northern 
District of California’s balance of common and individual issues has been affirmed post-Wal-Mart.  See, 
e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg, Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. 8:10ML2151 JVS (FMOx), 2012 WL 7802852, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012); Walker v. Life Ins. 
Co. of Southwest, No. CV 10–9198 JVS (RNBx), 2012 WL 7170602, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012). 
 111. See Napster, 2005 WL 1287611, at *1. 
 112. Id. at *3.  The Harry Fox Agency serves as a licensing agent for thousands of copyright 
holders in musical works.  See id. at *5; What Does HFA Do?, HARRY FOX AGENCY, 
http://perma.cc/AAF8-XHTF (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).  Also note that the class was ultimately 
certified as “consisting of music publisher-principals of the Fox Agency that owned or controlled at least 
one copyrighted musical work at the time that it was made available without their permission through 
the Napster service on or after October 30, 2000.”  See Napster, 2005 WL 1287611, at *12 (emphasis 
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individualized aspects of copyright, plaintiffs were able to abstract some of those 
individualized inquiries away from the case by limiting the class to Fox Agency 
principals.  For example, though there would be questions as to ownership and 
registration, because the Fox Agency had close relationships with every class 
member it would be able to expedite those determinations instead of leaving the 
court to wade through the evidence.113  Defining the class based on class members’ 
relationships with the Fox Agency also allowed for the production of generalized 
proof when it came to the DMCA safe harbor analysis, as part of the Agency’s job 
was to identify infringing material and bring it to the attention of the Internet 
service provider, here Napster.  Therefore, the Fox Agency was able to produce 
letters that identified thousands of specific infringements on behalf of class 
members, taking the burden of management off of the court.114  Finally, the court 
considered the fact that by delegating licensing authority and copyright 
enforcement duty to the Fox Agency, the class members expressed a willingness to 
have their claims adjudicated in their absence instead of interjecting individual 
concerns into each separate claim.115 
Though the court conceded that there would be difficulties managing the class 
simply because of its size, the court ultimately decided that the case was cohesive 
enough that it warranted class-wide adjudication.116  Invoking policy rationales for 
class actions, the court decided that, as compared to other methods of adjudication, 
“a class action is clearly the most efficient and in all likelihood the most equitable 
method for resolving the parties’ dispute.”117  The Napster plaintiffs did not present 
the court with an unintelligible “Frankenstein monster” like the proposed Football 
Association class, but instead provided the court with the common filter of the Fox 
Agency to help yoke each attendant aspect of the case into a manageable whole. 
This is not to say that membership to a common agency or similar representative 
institution is required for a putative class to obtain certification.  Such membership 
is just one way for putative class members to streamline the evidence and 
demonstrate to the court that class adjudication will actually prove more efficient 
than adjudication of individual suits.  Individual copyright holders could produce 
common evidence identifying putative class members, demonstrating that each 
putative class member has ownership in the copyright at issue, and that the 
defendant infringed each copyright at issue; the task simply becomes more 
realistically attainable when a single individual or institution maintains that 
evidence. 
Returning to the PhotogaPub hypothetical, limiting the subclasses by 
membership in Arnold and Beth’s guild could help with commonality in a manner 
similar to how working with the Fox Agency made the class more manageable in 
Napster.  As noted above, Subclass A may be able to provide the court with near-
 
omitted). 
 113. See Napster, 2005 WL 1287611, at *9. 
 114. See id. at *3. 
 115. See id. at *8. 
 116. See id. at *12. 
 117. Id. at *9. 
STERN, TAMING THE “FRANKENSTEIN MONSTER,” 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 549 (2015) 
570 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [38:4 
identical PhotogaPub contracts as common proof of presumed copyright 
ownership, while Subclass B does not have such contractual proof.  However, if 
Arnold and Beth’s guild maintains records of its members’ copyright registrations, 
then association with the guild can provide common proof of a presumption of 
copyright ownership just as well.  Subclass A will still have a better chance at 
certification because the contracts help to provide common proof of PhotogaPub’s 
liability, while membership in the guild is not likely to provide Subclass B with 
such proof.  However, defining Subclass B by membership in the guild would at 
least help the subclass to overcome commonality as to questions of initial 
ownership that could otherwise undermine the class’s chances at certification from 
the outset.  Narrowing both subclasses as to members’ association with a guild also 
provides the court with a filter to help maintain a baseline of class commonality, 
thereby maintaining the judicial efficiency goals of the class action mechanism. 
C.  ISSUE CLASSIFICATION:  COHESION WITHOUT NARROWING 
While defining the PhotogaPub subclasses narrowly has its benefits, Arnold, 
Beth and their lawyer might have concerns about limiting the class too far if their 
guild is small or if not many putative class members entered into common contracts 
with PhotogaPub.  Arnold and Beth want to represent as many photographers as 
possible, and their lawyer wants the stakes to be high enough for there to be 
sufficient incentive to take the case.  This is an earnest concern of putative classes 
arising in the increasingly digital age:  because digitization allows infringement to 
occur in broad-sweeping ways that were not previously possible, narrowly defining 
a class is not always practical, possible or necessarily the best way to ensure proper 
representation of all those affected by the conduct.  At the same time, copyright 
infringement claims against direct infringers for conduct involving digitization 
often concern identical patterns of conduct that make them ideal for class treatment, 
much like the conduct at issue in the PhotogaPub hypothetical.  This duality 
presents courts with a conundrum that continues to play out in perhaps one of the 
most followed copyright cases in recent years, Google Books.  Filed as a class 
action case, the Authors Guild brought a copyright infringement suit against 
Google for its unauthorized practice of copying books and making searchable 
“snippets” of the text available to users.118  Following the court’s rejection of a 
class-wide settlement, the parties moved forward with the litigation and the 
Authors Guild filed its motion for class certification. 
Google Books is a unique case because it lies on the spectrum between Napster 
and Football Association; the defendant’s conduct appears to be identical across all 
class members, creating a manageable class in one sense, but at the same time the 
class is so broad that it is not obviously cohesive.  The Authors Guild defined the 
plaintiff class as “all persons residing in the United States who hold a United States 
copyright interest in one or more Books reproduced by Google as part of its Library 
 
 118. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. (Google Books I), 282 F.R.D. 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(certification of Google Books class). 
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Project . . . .”119  They projected that this class would include “many thousands of 
authors.”120  As discussed above, managing a copyright class of this size can 
undermine the efficiency that class actions are supposed to bring to the courts. 
However, sometimes the questions common to all class members are so targeted 
and would bring such efficiency to the courts if litigated in one fell swoop that the 
individualized issues will not predominate and a 23(b)(3) class can be certified.  
Here, plaintiffs identified three common questions that penetrate the core of 
Google’s liability:  (1) whether Google distributed and publicly displayed content 
as alleged; (2) if these actions constitute copyright infringement; and (3) whether 
Google’s actions constitute a fair use of the works, thereby mooting any claims 
against Google on this issue.121  Though Google argued that questions of fair use 
are typically individualized,122 as discussed above, here Google’s conduct was so 
uniform that analyzing the entire class, or subclasses which take into account 
variations in the nature and markets for subsets of books, is not unimaginable.123  
There is a clear tension here between the rational understanding that each class 
member’s claim is best contextualized as part of Google’s group project and the 
pull of class action jurisprudence to only certify the most homogeneous classes. 
This tension is what appears to have motivated the Second Circuit to vacate the 
district court’s certification of the Google Books class on appeal.124  Reasoning that 
“resolution of Google’s fair use defense in the first instance will necessarily inform 
and perhaps moot [its] analysis of many class certification issues,” the court 
remanded the case for a decision on whether Google’s conduct constituted fair use 
before class certification could be considered.125  Though the court stated that 
consideration of fair use would only work to inform class certification, the remand 
was also a sly way of using one issue to decide the contentious aspects of class 
certification without getting the court’s hands dirty with a definitive stance on the 
class’s viability.  That is to say, there were a limited set of ways the case could 
have come out on remand:  (1) that Google’s conduct constituted fair use in the 
case of all class members, as the court did decide;126 (2) that Google’s conduct 
could not constitute fair use under any circumstance; (3) that Google’s conduct 
constituted fair use in the case of certain subclass members; or (4) that fair use 
needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis.  No matter the outcome, it would 
all but decide the issue of class certification without forcing the Second Circuit to 
 
 119. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 1–
4, Google Books I, 282 F.R.D. 384 (No. 05 Civ. 08136) [hereinafter Authors Guild’s Reply Motion for 
Class Certification]. 
 120. Id. at 9. 
 121. See id. at 10. 
 122. See Google’s Opposition to Class Certification, supra note 44, at 17–21. 
 123. In fact, Judge Chin suggested analyzing fair use on a sub-class basis in his opinion granting 
class certification.  See Google Books I, 282 F.R.D. at 395. 
 124. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc. (Google Books II), 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(decertification of Google Books Class). 
 125. Id. at 134. 
 126. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc. (Google Books III), 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 289 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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make difficult determinations as to what issues should predominate over others or 
to weigh the competing policy considerations in such a close call of a case.127  It 
was a sharp move to hone in on the controversy’s core issue and to try to resolve 
the nearly decade-long case.128 
By remanding the case for a consideration of the fair use issue, the Second 
Circuit effectively forced the parties to litigate the certification of a discrete issue 
without saying as much.  Under Rule 23, a plaintiff can bring a suit as an “issue 
class action” to resolve an issue that is common to all claimants.129  An issue class 
action is exactly as it sounds—where one issue, not an entire claim, meets all class 
certification requirements under Rules 23(a) and 23(b), the court can make a class-
wide judgment on this common issue to prevent having to decide on that issue time 
and time again as each individual plaintiff brings her claim.130  This helps to 
balance the tension that arises where litigating a claim would require individualized 
inquiries even though there is an overarching common course of conduct that 
should be decided uniformly across all claimants, securing the advantages of 
adjudicating common issues on a class-wide basis while still giving each 
individualized issue its due attention on a case-by-case basis.131 
This appears to be the type of move the Second Circuit forced because even 
though, on the one hand, the court stated that class certification was premature 
because the questions of commonality, typicality and predominance were too 
obfuscated, on the other hand, the court implied that if fair use was taken separately 
from the rest of the issues it would be clear whether the discrete issue of fair use 
could be applied class-wide.132  Each party hoped to engulf the entire claim under 
one of two competing narratives.  In contrast, the Second Circuit hoped to secure 
 
 127. The Second Circuit relied on the fact that a fair use determination would effectively decide all 
issues of typicality, commonality, and predominance.  Only questions of adequacy, relating to some 
authors’ desire to have Google’s project continue because of the benefit they derive from it, would 
remain.  See Google Books II, 721 F.3d at 134. 
 128. It is notable that in October 2012, Judge Baer of the Southern District of New York dismissed 
the Authors Guild’s case against a group of libraries that obtained digital scans of works in their 
collections through Google’s digitization project, holding that the libraries’ actions constitute fair use.  
See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 465–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  Given that the 
case against Google Books was near identical to the HathiTrust case in many respects, it made sense for 
the Second Circuit to push the case down the path to a quick fair use determination rather than try to sort 
out the messy class certification doctrine. 
 129. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.2d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 
2011) (“[C]lass action treatment is appropriate and is permitted by Rule 23 when the judicial economy 
from consolidation of separate claims outweighs any concern with possible inaccuracies from their 
being lumped together in a single proceeding for decision by a single judge or jury.  Often, and as it 
seems to us here, these competing considerations can be reconciled in a ‘mass tort’ case by carving at 
the joints of the parties’ dispute.  If there are genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the 
claimants, issues moreover the accuracy of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by 
repeated proceedings, then it makes good sense, especially when the class is large, to resolve those 
issues in one fell swoop while leaving the remaining, claimant-specific issues to individual follow-on 
proceedings.” (Posner, J.)). 
 130. See id. 
 131. See Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of 
Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 263 (2002). 
 132. See Google Books II, 721 F.3d at 132. 
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judicial economy and showed an understanding of the fact that some aspects of the 
case are more appropriate for class-wide resolution than others.  It demonstrated 
that just because a claim presents complex issues does not mean that a court should 
bar itself from efficiently dealing with the claim’s simpler issues on a class-wide 
basis.  At the same time, just because a claim presents issues that can be decided on 
a class-wide basis does not mean that the court should bind itself to deciding the 
more complex aspects of that claim in the same manner.  Instead, there is a middle 
ground around which the court can divide each aspect of the claim and then certify 
or not certify the class as to an individual issue based on the class’s ability to meet 
the Rule 23 requirements as to that issue, rather than based on the class’s ability to 
meet Rule 23’s requirements as to a related yet distinct issue. 
Though there are obvious reasons why plaintiffs such as Arnold and Beth would 
want to certify classes as to the entirety of their claims; where copyright 
infringement claims are subject to questions of copyright ownership, licensing and 
the like, it may be in the best interest of the putative class to attempt issue class 
certification instead.  This is particularly true in a case such as Arnold and Beth’s, 
where it would be too expensive for most class members to bring their claims 
individually and where class-wide pressure could be enough to encourage 
settlement or deter PhotogaPub from continuing its allegedly malicious behavior.133 
In the majority of circuits, including the Second, Ninth, and Seventh, where 
copyright infringement claims are often brought, an issue class can be certified 
even if a claim on the whole could not be certified under Rule 23.134  This means 
that even if there are individualized questions as to copyright ownership a plaintiff 
class can still be certified to determine whether a common scheme of alleged 
copyright infringement is actually infringing.  If it is, individual members of that 
class can then bring their own claims to prove individual ownership and collect 
damages without a fear that courts will analyze liability differently from case to 
case.  This type of issue class action is a “partial class action” and allows the joint 
resolution of all common claims for the sake of judicial economy.135  There is no 
rule for how the issues are split136 as long as individualized questions do not 
predominate on that particular issue and thereby preclude any efficiency gains that 
issue classification might provide.137  Because issue classes are so flexible and can, 
in many cases, be easily carved out, those wary of 23(b) classification have looked 
to issue classes as the future of class action litigation, as they are the classes that are 
 
 133. See Smith, supra note 36, at 1191. 
 134. See id. at 1188–89.  The Fifth Circuit rejects this view of Rule 23(c)(4) and requires that the 
entire claim satisfy Rule 23 before an issue class may be certified, while the Third Circuit uses a 
balancing test to determine whether Rule 23(c)(4) is applicable.  See id. 
 135. See id. at 1204. 
 136. See Hydrite Chem. Co. v. Calumet Lubricants Co., 47 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]here 
is no rule that if a trial is bifurcated, it must be bifurcated between liability and damages.  The judge can 
bifurcate (or for that matter trifurcate, or slice even more finely) a case at whatever point will minimize 
the overlap in evidence between the segmented phases or otherwise promote economy and accuracy in 
adjudication.”). 
 137. See Smith, supra note 36, at 1221 (internal citations omitted). 
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most consistent with the reasons for class actions in the first place.138 
Issue class certification can be particularly helpful when it comes to copyright 
holder classes because, as copyright infringement becomes more entwined with the 
digital world, these classes can often be defined in broad, if not global, terms.  
Dealing with discrete aspects of these claims on a class-wide basis can help class 
members to access justice where it would otherwise be too costly or, if issue 
classification did not exist, where class members’ claims would be too disparate.  
At the same time, stepping back for a moment to Football Association, the case that 
prompted this discussion, courts do not need to worry that broader use of issue 
classification will open the floodgates of copyright class litigation.  Some claims, 
like Football Association, are unfit for class-wide adjudication no matter how they 
are sliced.  There, class members’ claims are bound together only in theory, 
without bonds of common fact.  Rule 23(c)(4) does not allow such claims to 
masquerade as a united cause, ensuring judicial efficiency but not at the cost of 
adequate representation for every class member.  Through the use of issue classes, 
common theories of copyright infringement liability, which are properly barred by 
Rule 23(b), would not overrun common instances of copyright infringement, which 
can be unduly barred by a cautious court if plaintiffs pursue classification under 
Rule 23(b) instead. 
Stepping back to the PhotogaPub hypothetical, Arnold and Beth may be best off 
attempting to certify the class on the fair use issue instead of paring down the 
subclasses to what could impractically narrow denominators.  With issue class 
certification as to the question of fair use, Arnold and Beth have the opportunity to 
maintain the entire worldwide class they originally envisioned because the core of 
what matters is PhotogaPub’s conduct.  Though the fair use analysis may vary as to 
each work at issue, as discussed in Part I.B., the analysis here is likely to be as 
uniform as that in Google Books because PhotogaPub copied, displayed, and 
monetized every work on its site in a uniform way, taking the entire work in each 
case.  Arnold and Beth may have difficulty demonstrating that there is common 
proof as to the nature of each work and to the market effect of PhotogaPub’s 
conduct on each work; however, given the Google Books precedent in deciding fair 
use as to all claims, PhotogaPub’s interest in photographs that have enough artistic 
merit to support gallery shows, and the fact that most of the putative PhotogaPub 
class members are at a similar point in their careers and cater to a limited market, 
Arnold and Beth have a strong case to argue that common, class-wide evidence as 
to the issue of fair use is available and that the issue is better suited for class-wide 
adjudication than case-by-case determinations. 
If they are able to certify the class as to this issue, Arnold and Beth will then be 
in a better position to leverage their claim into a settlement for the entire class or, if 
PhotogaPub resists settlement, to make the case for certifying the class as to the 
entire claim down the line.  This way, Arnold and Beth can avoid over-narrowing 
the subclasses—Subclass B in particular—upfront and approach what may be a 
 
 138. See, e.g., Romberg, supra note 131, at 261–63 (referring to Rule 23(c)(4) as “the hero of this 
story”). 
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class-skeptical court with a group that is cohesive despite its size. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the Supreme Court’s arguable strengthening of the commonality 
requirement and its shift of classes seeking monetary relief to the stringent Rule 
23(b)(3) requirements, it is difficult to identify an area of law under which a claim 
would be a natural shoe-in for class-wide resolution.  While copyright infringement 
claims lend themselves to individualized inquiries, to single out copyright holder 
classes as particularly unfit for class treatment can overlook the efficiency to be 
gained by grouping together copyright infringement claims that arise out of a single 
course of conduct, such as mass digitization.  Overstating the individualized aspects 
of copyright infringement can also undermine sound attempts at bringing a 
copyright infringement claim on a class-wide basis.  Not every putative copyright 
holder class is defined by the same parameters; some are defined by pre-established 
copyright ownership or by association with common evidence of infringement, 
obviating the usefulness of the class action mechanism.  Rather than assessing a 
class’s fitness for class certification by reference to the type of law under which a 
claim is brought, it is important to take each putative class on its own terms. 
On the other side, it is important for plaintiffs seeking class certification to be 
mindful of the reasons for the class action mechanism.  If the Supreme Court’s 
recent class action jurisprudence is clear on one thing, it is that the class action 
mechanism should be maintained as a tool of judicial efficiency.  Therefore, 
plaintiffs must be realistic about the breadth of their claims and tailor their requests 
for class certification to the aspects of their claims that are clearly common.  As 
demonstrated through the PhotogaPub hypothetical, in some cases this means 
attempting to certify only a small subclass of the originally conceived class or a 
subset of issues instead of the entire claim.  By doing this, classes will not be 
viewed as Frankenstein monsters, but as cohesive units that are intuitively best 
addressed on a class-wide basis. 
 
